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Should	the	law	facilitate	the	removal	of	the	children	of
terrorists	and	extremists	from	their	care?
In	light	of	the	recent	debate	in	the	media	about	whether	the	children	of	those	convicted	of	terrorist
offences	should	be	removed	from	their	care,	Fatima	Ahdash	draws	on	case	law	to	explain	why	this	is
both	a	difficult	and	dangerous	issue	for	family	courts.
Mark	Rowley,	Assistant	Commissioner	of	the	Metropolitan	Police	and	head	of	Counter-Terrorism
policing	recently	called	for	the	children	of	those	“convicted	of	terrorist	offences,	including	radicalisers”
to	be	removed	from	the	care	of	their	parents.	Rowley	argued	that	although	family	courts	and	local
authorities	now	routinely	deal	with	child	protection	and	safeguarding	concerns	arising	in	the	context	of
terrorism	and	extremism,	there	are	also	cases	of	parents	convicted	of	terrorism	being	allowed	to	retain	custody	and
care	of	their	children.	Rowley	also	controversially	compared	parents	with	extremist	and	radical	religious	beliefs	to
paedophiles,	calling	for	greater	“parity”	in	the	law’s	treatment	of	both	categories	of	individuals.
The	comments	have,	predictably,	led	to	very	sensationalist	media	reporting.	Some	commentators	have	lent	their
support	to	Rowley’s	calls,	arguing	that	parents	who	have	been	convicted	of	relevant	offences	or	who	indoctrinate
their	children	with	narratives	of	religious	or	racial	supremacy	are	committing	“emotional	abuse”	that	is	similar	to	and
should	be	treated	the	same	as	physical	or	sexual	abuse.
This	debate	is,	however,	not	a	new	one.	Since	the	rise	of	ISIS	in	2014	and	the	concerns	with	children	and	families
travelling	to	ISIS-held	territories,	there	has	been	growing	concern	with	childhood	radicalisation.	In	March	2014	Boris
Johnson	claimed	that	“hundreds	of	children”	were	being	radicalised	in	their	homes	and	called	for	the	law	to	“treat
radicalisation	as	a	form	of	child	abuse”	so	that	“children	who	are	being	turned	into	potential	killers	or	suicide	bombers
can	be	removed	into	care.	”	Radicalisation	and	extremism	have,	moreover,	been	increasingly	identified	and	treated
as	safeguarding	concerns	and	as	new	categories	of	child	protection.
Does	the	law	allow	for	the	removal	of	the	children	of	convicted	terrorists	and/or	extremists?
For	those	convicted	of	terrorist	offences	and	who	have	already	served	a	sentence,	the	law	suggests	that	Mark
Rowley’s	proposals	are	indeed	possible.	The	Court	of	Appeal	recently	held	that	the	imposition	of	licence	conditions
that	restrict	a	convicted	terrorist	offender’s	contact	with	his	children	were	lawful	and	proportionate	under	Article	8	of
the	European	Convention	of	Human	Rights	and	do	not,	therefore,	violate	the	right	to	private	and	family	life.
But	what	about	the	role	of	the	family	courts?	A	growing	body	of	English	case-law,	referred	to	as	the	‘ radicalisation
cases	in	the	family	courts’	touch	on	this	question,	with	the	answer	appearing	to	be	(a	reluctant)	yes.	In	A	Local
Authority	v	T	and	Others,	care	orders	brought	by	a	local	authority	against	a	mother	who	travelled	with	her	son	to	the
ISIS-stronghold	city	of	Raqqa	were	approved.	In	Leicester	City	Council	v	T,	a	local	authority’s	application	to	remove
the	children	of	a	mother	who	had	been	apprehended	at	an	airport	and	accused	of	attempting	to	travel	with	her
children	to	join	ISIS	in	Syria	was	also	approved.
The	cases	also	suggest	that	for	the	family	courts	it	is	not	just	travel	to	Syria	and	the	commitment	of	terrorist-related
offences	that	would	justify	the	removal	of	children	from	their	homes.	In	A	Local	Authority	v	HB,	the	religious	and/or
political	extremism	of	parents	was	identified	as	a	“new	harm”	from	which	children	must	be	protected.	In	the	very
important	case	of	London	Borough	of	Tower	Hamlets	v	B,	the	removal	of	a	child	from	the	care	of	her	parents	was
approved	following	the	finding	that	she	had	been	emotionally	harmed	viewing	copious	amounts	of	very	graphic	ISIS
propaganda.	In	theory,	therefore,	the	family	courts	can	and	do	intervene	to	protect	the	children	of	convicted	terrorists
and/or	extremists.
Nevertheless,	the	courts’	approach	towards	removal	has	rightly	been	cautious.	Firstly,	of	all	the	published
radicalisation	cases,	permanent	removal	has	only	been	sanctioned	in	very	few	cases	where	the	harms	and	risks
involved	were	obvious.	The	family	courts	prefer,	where	possible,	for	other	less	draconian	measures,	including
electronic	tagging	(see	Re	X;	Re	Y	and	Re	C,D,E	)	or	care	orders	that	allow	for	ongoing	support	and	monitoring	of
the	children	(see	for	example	Re	M	(Children)	(No2),		and	A	Local	Authority	v	M	and	Others).
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Secondly,	as	pointed	out	by	Martin	Downs,	the	family	courts	have	applied	the	threshold	criteria	and	evidentiary
burden	rather	stringently	in	the	radicalisation	cases	(see	notable	examples	here,	here	and	here).	In	these	cases,	the
local	authorities’	applications	for	care	and/or	wardship	orders	were	rejected	on	the	basis	that	there	was	not	enough
evidence	to	support	the	contention	that	the	parents	were	extremists	and	tried	to	take	their	children	to	Syria,	even
though	the	local	authorities’	evidence	was	strong.	But	suspicions	that	do	not	meet	the	necessary	burden	of	proof,	the
family	judges	have	reiterated,	are	not	enough	to	warrant	compulsory	intervention.
The	point	here	is	that	family	law	does	not	operate	in	as	simple	a	manner	as	Rowley’s	comments	seem	to	suggest.
Rowley	and	others	calling	for	greater	intervention	by	the	family	courts	would	do	well	to	remember	Hayden	J’s
remarks	in	London	Borough	of	Tower	Hamlets	v	M	and	Others:	“it	is	the	interest	of	the	individual	child	that	is
paramount.	This	cannot	be	eclipsed	by	wider	considerations	of	counter	terrorism	policy	or	operations.”
Should	the	law	facilitate	the	removal	of	the	children	of	convicted	terrorists	and/or	extremists?
The	family	courts’	cautious	approach	to	removals	in	the	context	of	terrorism	and	extremism	highlights	the	legal	and
practical	difficulties	with	Rowley’s	suggestion.	The	first	difficulty	pertains	to	the	obvious	fact	that	not	all	individuals
convicted	of	terrorist	offences	are	the	same.	This	is	particularly	true	given	the	wide	and	inchoate	nature	of	terrorism-
related	offences	in	England	and	Wales:	someone	convicted	of	glorifying	terrorism	is	not	as	dangerous	as	someone
convicted	of	possessing	firearms	and	planning	to	carry	out	an	attack.	Yet	Rowley’s	comments	do	not	account	for	this
disparity.
Secondly,	courts	need	to	be	clear	about	the	purpose	of	removal,	since	removals	can	ultimately	harm	children.	Before
advocating	even	more	removals,	we	must	ask	ourselves	what	exactly	are	we	trying	to	achieve	through	removal	and
can	this	be	achieved	through	less	drastic	means?	Removals	are	a	very	serious	interference	with	the	right	of	both
parents	and	children	to	private	and	family	life.	Although	it	is	true	that	the	protection	of	children	is	a	legitimate	aim	that
can	potentially	justify	such	an	interference,	the	measure	taken	must	be	proportionate	to	the	aim	sought.	As	was
suggested	by	Marina	Wheeler	QC	and	Martin	Downs,	far	less	drastic	options	such	as	referrals	to	Prevent	(as
problematic	and	controversial	as	it	may	be)	are	available.
Finally,	we	must	not	forget	the	fact	that	the	harm	that	Rowley	and	others	want	to	protect	children	from	is	ideological
and	therefore	difficult	to	assess.	Assessing	whether	or	not	a	child	has	been	‘abused’	through	indoctrination	brings	the
family	courts	dangerously	close	to	the	realm	of	thought-policing.	This	danger	is	confounded	when	we	consider	that
we	lack	a	clear	legal	definition	of	extremism	and	radicalisation,	relying	instead	on	vague,	controversial	and
ideologically	charged	definitions	from	counter-terrorism	and	security	policy.
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